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Abstract: This paper seeks to understand what government mechan-
isms have allowed China’s wind industry to grow as fast as it has over 
the past ten years. Instead of formal rules and regulations, this paper 
focuses on specific sets of institutional conditions that have been 
crucial in the process of high-speed implementation of wind energy 
in China. Specifically, fragmentation and centralisation, together with 
policy experimentation and policy learning, have been fundamental 
for policy flexibility and institutional adaptability. The paper illustrates 
that there are benefits and disadvantages to these characteristics, and 
that inherent qualities of China’s governing system that lead to rapid 
growth overlap with those that lead to challenges in terms of quality 
and long-term performance. 
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Introduction 
China’s development of renewable energy technologies over the past 
ten years can be considered the start of a renewable energy journey. 
Since 80 per cent of China’s electricity generation is fuelled by fossil 
fuels and electricity consumption is increasing rapidly (EIA 2014), the 
question arises of whether the People’s Republic will be able to sus-
tain the increasing energy needs of its citizens without causing irrev-
ocable environmental damage. China’s wind industry has grown from 
0.8 gigawatt (GW) installed capacity in 2004 to 91 GW as of the be-
ginning of 2014 (Li et al. 2007; GWEC 2014). This represents a vel-
ocity of capacity development never before witnessed, and has in-
volved the coordination of interests and an alignment of institutions 
on a massive scale. The growth has led to many challenges, such as 
uncertainties over the long-term performance of Chinese turbines, 
transmission constraints for remote regions, lack of qualified person-
nel and delays in connecting wind farms to the electrical grid 
(Martinot 2010). Several reports and studies agree that these challen-
ges have arisen due to a lack of coordination between stakeholders in 
China’s wind turbine industry (e.g. Jiang 2011; Luo, Zhi, and Zhang 
2012; REN21 2009; Zhang et al. 2009). Nevertheless, we still lack a 
detailed understanding of the governing mechanisms behind the rapid 
growth of the wind industry. 
This paper argues that a specific set of institutional conditions 
has been crucial for the high-speed implementation of renewable 
energy. “Institutions”, in this paper, refers not to government bodies, 
but to forces – regulations, norms and heuristics – that structure and 
coordinate human activity. Fragmentation and centralisation, together 
with policy experimentation and policy learning, have been funda-
mental for policy flexibility and institutional adaptability. Building on 
the work of Lema and Ruby (2007), who conclude that coordination 
has been important for the growth of China’s wind industry, this 
study looks at the processes that have led to coordination, including 
experimentation and scaling up. Also covering the period of 2011 to 
2014, a time with slower growth, I present evidence that coordination 
and fragmentation are mechanisms the government takes advantage 
of to control industry growth. These features make China’s energy 
governance system highly flexible and adaptive, enabling and con-
straining growth according to policy preferences, but the same fea-
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tures have also led to the considerable challenges the industry is fac-
ing. 
Several recent works have addressed the relationship between in-
stitutions and renewable energy implementation in China. Some have 
provided general overviews and updates (e.g. Martinot and Li 2007, 
2010), some have looked specifically at the policy regime and institu-
tions (Cherni and Kentish 2007; García 2011, 2013; Schuman and Lin 
2012; Wang 2007; Zhang, Andrews-Speed, and Zhao 2013) and some 
have looked at innovation and technology transfer (e.g. Gosens and 
Lu 2013; Huang et al. 2012; Klagge, Liu, and Campos Silva 2012; 
Lewis 2013; Ru et al. 2012; Urban, Nordensvärd, and Zhou 2012; 
Zhou et al. 2012). Most of these studies highlight the explosive de-
velopment of China’s wind industry and the considerable challenges 
this has led to. Certain notable exceptions look at the institutional 
mechanisms on a level deeper than the formal laws (i.e. Lema and 
Ruby 2007; Mah and Hills 2014), but few studies show how the same 
institutional framework has inherent advantages and disadvantages 
vis-à-vis the development of the wind industry. Implementing legisla-
tion is a craft, and China’s achievement of growing the largest wind 
turbine industry in the world in only ten years cannot simply be re-
duced to a set of laws. In taking a broader institutional approach, this 
paper seeks to understand what institutional traits beyond the formal 
laws and regulations have induced the rapid growth of China’s wind 
power industry.  
The paper proceeds as follows: First I summarise the most rele-
vant approaches to China’s institutions and governance. I then intro-
duce the methodology and proceed to give a brief overview of Chi-
na’s wind power policy framework and development over the last ten 
years. I then introduce aspects of fragmentation and policy learning 
that have benefitted the industry, and address the aspects of authori-
tarianism that have likewise benefitted the industry. Finally, I discuss 
the findings, evaluate the usefulness of this institutional approach in 
understanding China’s rapid wind industry development and draw 
conclusions. 
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Institutions and Governance in China 
Flexibility, Learning and Policy Experiments 
This paper examines the development of the wind energy industry in 
China in light of recent theoretical contributions on Chinese govern-
ance, and it deliberately avoids using theories developed in a non-
Chinese setting. I believe, as found by, for instance, Heilmann and 
Perry (2011), that Chinese institutions are unique and need be studied 
on their own terms. Scholarly discussions of governance and politics 
in China often revolve around tensions between centralisation and 
decentralisation, plan and market, local and national levels, rural and 
urban environments, or industrial and agricultural settings (Dittmer 
and Liu 2006; Fewsmith 2010; Lieberthal 2004; Saich 2011). Observ-
ing similar tensions in China’s energy sector in the 1980s, Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg (1988) developed the highly influential concept of 
“fragmented authoritarianism”. Their main conclusion was that the 
energy policy process is protracted, disjointed and incremental. Fur-
thermore, the fragmentation of authority creates inter-ministerial 
competition and disjointed policymaking, because respective minis-
tries have a similar level of authority, but disparate goals. This means 
that any policy initiative or major project “need[s] to acquire the ac-
tive cooperation of many bureaucratic units that are themselves nest-
ed in distinct chains of authority” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 
22). Despite the fragmentation, the very top of the Chinese political 
system is authoritarian and able to push through directives (Lieberthal 
and Lampton 1992).  
Since Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s thesis was developed, it has 
been increasingly acknowledged that flexibility, learning and adapta-
tion have been central to China’s massive transition process, and 
China scholars have put more emphasis on institutional capacities. 
For instance, Dulbecco and Renard argue that China’s economic 
success resides in reconciling  
the permanency of a well-established institutional order required 
for the coordination of individual plans, and the flexibility of insti-
tutions necessary for the move towards the market (Dulbecco and 
Renard 2003: 328).  
Gu and Lundvall (2006) highlight the importance of policy learning 
for China’s innovation performance and emphasise the benefits of a 
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simultaneously centralised and decentralised system. Recently, Heil-
mann and Perry (2011) termed China’s governing method a “guerrilla 
policy style” – with reference to the governing methods adopted 
during Mao’s reign – which explains how Chinese governing institu-
tions have been able to manage sudden change and uncertainty 
throughout the decades. 
Heilmann (2008a, 2008b, 2009) coined the concept of “experi-
mentation under hierarchy” to describe the process by which China’s 
institutional structure has innovated and adapted alongside large-scale 
economic change. Heilmann (2008b: 3) writes that this adaptability is 
due to a practice of policy experimentation in China that “precedes 
the enactment of many national policies”. In short, he explains that 
policy experimentation, by delegating responsibility to local officials, 
“reduced the frictions and delays characteristic of top-level consen-
sus-building and interagency accommodation, and helped to avoid 
protracted policy deadlock” (Heilmann 2008b: 21). By starting with a 
smaller policy area, and scaling up only when successful, policy experi- 
mentation was a useful way to gain consensus amongst top-level polit- 
icians, since it entailed placing the policy burden on local govern-
ments and attributing the national success to the given policy (Heil-
mann 2008b). This experimentation can therefore be considered one 
way in which the fragmentation of authority is lessened. 
Moreover, policy experiments are initiated not only from the top 
down in China: Andrews-Speed points out that “fragmentation has 
allowed for local policy initiatives, some of which have been successful 
and have then been taken up by the central government” (Andrews-
Speed 2012: 13, emphasis added). Some policies have therefore been 
introduced from the bottom up. Wang (2009) argues that experi-
mental government policy, experience and practice have been im-
portant for fine-tuning China’s policy machinery. Grassroots prac-
tices, in particular, have been an important source of policy learning 
for the central government. Fischer (2010) argues that a combination 
of top-down and bottom-up policies may be the best approach for 
sustainability transitions, especially with reference to rapidly changing 
institutions. At their base, most accounts of China’s institutional flex-
ibility are notions of learning and adaptation – crucial for any kind of 
rapid change. These notions provide a useful background to under-
standing governance in China, and as will become evident in the fol-
lowing sections of this paper, fragmentation, learning and adaptation 
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are concepts that resonate well with the analysis of China’s wind in-
dustry. 
Energy Governance in China and the Portfolio  
Approach
Governance of the energy sector is high-level politics in China. Li 
(2013) points out that all the members of China’s newly elected Polit-
buro Standing Committee, as well as several previous members, have 
important links to the energy sector. Many of them have either made 
a political career through the oil and gas industry, or have been CEOs 
of some of China’s largest oil companies. The Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) is the glue that changes and dictates the direction of 
development (Andrews-Speed 2011). Contrary to common percep-
tions, China’s energy governance is not strictly organised from the 
top down. The perception that China, with an authoritarian govern-
ment, both knows and easily gets what it wants has been challenged 
over the past decade (Cunningham 2010; Downs 2008; Kong 2009). 
Energy decisions are highly politicised in China because they involve 
many different actors with diverging interests and objectives. This has 
led to a state of affairs where there is 
a “leadership vacuum” in China over energy policy and many de-
cisions are driven by projects promoted by localities or industries 
rather than being guided by a coherent national energy policy 
(Kong 2009: 791). 
Therefore, a change in energy policy amongst top-level leadership 
does not necessarily equate to smooth implementation throughout 
the system. Implementation can be constrained by vague or contra-
dictory formulation of regulations, or because local government offi-
cials prioritise economic growth at the expense the environment 
(Meidan, Andrews-Speed, and Xin 2009). Thus, even though power is 
“centralised”, this does not mean that it is concentrated in the centre. 
The most important body regulating wind energy policy centrally 
in China is the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC). Within the NDRC, the National Energy Administration 
(NEA) is responsible for developing and implementing renewable 
energy policies, but the administration is too heavily understaffed to 
be completely on top of emerging developments (Downs 2008; 
Anonymous 3 2011). Provincial governments also have their own 
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Development and Reform Commissions that develop and implement 
local policies, sometimes in conflict with policies developed centrally 
(Mah and Hills 2014). Other important government actors are the 
“big five” state-owned power generation companies, and the two grid 
companies State Grid and Southern Grid. The grid companies and 
the “big five” have much influence in terms of what projects are de-
veloped and where, and often pursue their own agendas (Andrews-
Speed 2012; Rosen and Houser 2007). 
Fragmentation prevails in China’s energy sector, but Cunning-
ham’s (2009) seminal research shows how the government uses liber-
alisation and consolidation as a means to control the growth in the 
coal and electric power industries, in what he terms a “portfolio ap-
proach to energy governance”. Cunningham finds that central owner-
ship of the electric power industry has fluctuated over time, demon-
strating less regulation in times of electricity supply shortage, and 
more in times of sufficient electricity supply. This has led to alternat-
ing periods of rapid expansion and contraction. Indeed, an alternating 
wave of consolidation and liberalisation has, over time, characterised 
China’s electric power facilities, depending on the central govern-
ment’s concern at the moment. As we shall see below, something 
similar can be said about fragmentation and centralisation in the wind 
power industry. 
Method
This paper is based on twelve semi-structured interviews conducted 
between August and December 2011, a substantial review of relevant 
literature and participation at wind energy events in China since 2011. 
Interview informants had varied backgrounds, ranging from govern-
ment officials and technical wind industry experts to company em-
ployees from large, medium and small manufacturers of wind tur-
bines. An overview of the informants can be found in the Appendix. 
Several informal conversations were held from 2011 to 2014 with 
domestic and foreign experts and people involved in the renewable 
energy industry. These include wind farm developers, researchers, 
wind industry experts and professionals, as well as private and state-
owned wind turbine component manufacturers. Moreover, important 
insights were collected at the following conferences and industry 
exhibitions: China Wind Power 2011 and 2013, Offshore Wind China 
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2012 and 2013, and the 8th China (Shanghai) International Wind 
Energy Exhibition and Conference 2014. The analysis is also founded 
on a wide range of secondary sources such as reports and research 
articles. Many documents were accessed during the fieldwork – for 
instance, information from the Chinese Renewable Energy Industries 
Association (CREIA) or the various companies visited. Online news 
articles were especially useful for retrieving the latest information on 
China’s rapidly developing wind industry.  
Interview candidates were identified through online research, in-
dustry association lists and trade statistics and, most importantly, the 
snowball method. The underlying reasoning behind selecting particu-
lar interview candidates was to be able to map the opinions of central 
actors in order to paint a representative picture of important industry 
factors. Interviews, therefore, involved enquiry into the relevant 
stakeholders’ perceptions of overall wind industry performance. Can-
didates perceived to be relevant were informed experts at universities, 
organisations, consultancy firms and the government, as well as wind 
turbine company employees. These groups were deemed relevant 
because of their industry knowledge and varied backgrounds in dif-
ferent segments of the industry. The transcribed interviews were 
analysed using the computer-assisted software NVivo. This software 
was of great assistance in coding and categorising material, allowing 
for systematic analysis. There are some considerations that need to be 
mentioned in regards to the interviews. First, nine interviews were 
conducted in English, while three were in Chinese, using an inter-
preter. Using an interpreter can make it difficult to ensure that the 
question has been understood as intended, and that the answer is 
correctly transmitted. Second, only three of the interviewees were 
native English speakers. Using a second language may cause people 
to say things they did not really mean, or it may tweak the meaning of 
what was originally intended. These two caveats have been taken into 
account and were dealt with – for instance, by repeating the question 
or clarifying meanings in cases where there was any doubt. I am 
therefore confident that the following analysis represents the views of 
the interviewees. 
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Formal Institutions Promoting Wind Power in 
China
This section provides an overview of the formal policies that have 
promoted China’s wind power development, divided into two main 
areas: those that promote industry, and those that promote electricity 
generation. These regulations have been discussed extensively else-
where (e.g. Lewis 2013; Zhang, Andrews-Speed, and Zhao 2013) and 
will be covered only briefly here. 
Industry Development 
At least three important factors have directly promoted the develop-
ment of China’s wind industry. First, the domestic content require-
ment of wind turbine manufacturing in China has led to the devel-
opment of supply chain markets; second, speedy approval for wind 
power projects at a provincial level has resulted in a huge increase in 
the number of wind turbines each year (Yadav 2011); and third, in 
2011, China attracted 52 billion USD in new renewable energy in-
vestments, 60 per cent of which went to wind projects (UNEP, 
FSFM, and BNEF 2012). In that year, China attracted the most new 
financial investments for new renewable energy in the world (UNEP, 
FSFM, and BNEF 2012). 
In 2002, the Chinese government decided to stimulate the devel-
opment of wind energy through a national wind concession pro-
gramme, allocating selected sites for wind farm construction to the 
company bidding the lowest electricity tariff (Recknagel 2010). Some 
prerequisites were made in order for projects to be accepted, such as 
restrictions on turbine size and local content. In effect, the price of 
electricity not only decided who won the bid, but also the extent to 
which the turbines were manufactured locally (Wang 2010). Because 
of a dependence on expensive, imported turbines, the Chinese gov-
ernment decided that a domestic content requirement pertaining to 
wind turbines was needed to facilitate domestic manufacturing of 
turbines and turbine parts (Howell et al. 2010). During the first con-
cession round, which started in 2003, the local content requirement 
of turbines was set at 50 per cent; in 2004 this share was increased to 
70 per cent, and in 2009 it was finally phased out (Wang 2010). In 
addition to content requirements, import tariffs on preassembled 
wind turbines were at 17 per cent in 2007, whilst tariffs on their 
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components were set to only 3 per cent (Martinot and Li 2007). This 
policy, together with the removal of local content requirements in 
2009, is thought to have “allow[ed] domestic manufacturers to more 
easily access wind components from foreign suppliers as they buil[t] 
the prototypes for their larger turbines” (BNEF 2010). 
Electricity Generation 
Measures aimed at increasing the proportion of renewable electricity 
production in China are covered in the Renewable Energy Law 
(ReLaw) enacted in 2005, which initially came into force on 1 January 
2006 (with subsequent amendments effective April 2010). The Cen-
tral Committee enacted the law with overwhelming support, suggest-
ing that Chinese legislators almost unanimously recognised the need 
for renewable energy (Wang 2007). The law was drafted over a two-
year period, and advice and comments were provided by international 
and domestic experts, various types of organisations and governmen-
tal bodies in order to calibrate it to fit China’s ambitions (Anonymous 
3 2011 and 4 2011; Martinot and Li 2007). The law was, therefore, 
the result of an international learning process, in which experiences 
from abroad were taken into consideration prior to enactment. This 
was also the case before each of the major revisions of the ReLaw in 
2009 and 2010.  
ReLaw measures include government installation goals, manda-
tory market shares, a tariff system, a cost-sharing principle and a spe-
cial fund (Jiang 2011: 105). The largest investors in Chinese wind 
farms are state-owned power generation companies, notably the “big 
five”: Guodian, Huaneng, Datang, Huadian and China Power In-
vestment Group (CPI) (Li et al. 2012). In 2013, these were the five-
largest wind farm developers, with a combined share of almost 50 per 
cent of all projects (WWEA 2014). All utilities with a capacity of 
more than 5 GW of thermal power electricity generation were man-
dated by the government, through the 11th Five-Year Plan for Re-
newable Energy, to instal at least 3 per cent non-hydro renewable 
power as a portion of their total capacity by 2010, and 8 per cent by 
2020 (Li et al. 2010: 39). These mandated market shares undoubtedly 
led to an increase in wind power investments. However, one down-
side was that the large power utilities only cared to fulfil their installed 
capacity criteria, and had less of an incentive to focus on the hourly 
production of electricity, which demanded more resources in terms 
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of operation and maintenance. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
ReLaw, electric utilities are obligated to purchase all wind power pro-
duced and, with the 2009 amendment of the ReLaw, this obligation 
applies even when there is insufficient power demand on the grid 
(Martinot and Li 2010). 
Coordination, Fragmentation and Policy  
Experimentation
Concession Rounds as Policy Experiments 
A central point made by Lema and Ruby (2007) is that the period 
prior to the national wind concession programme, which began in 
2002, was dominated by an extensive fragmentation of authority – for 
instance, in deciding whether to establish a domestic industry or rely 
on imported turbines. With the concession strategy, however, this 
fragmentation changed, and the NDRC took a more active role in 
coordinating the supply of and demand for wind power. Lema and 
Ruby also note that coordination between the trade and industry 
departments is what sparked the domestic wind turbine industry. This 
change in the status of the NDRC was undoubtedly important; how-
ever, Lema and Ruby underestimate the importance of the conces-
sion projects as an experimental point for policy development. Be-
tween 2003 and 2007, there were five concession rounds totalling 2.6 
GW of installed wind power capacity, against a total of 6 GW of 
installed wind power at the end of 2007 (Jiang et al. 2011), amounting 
to 43 per cent. Each concession round grew in size, starting at 200 
megawatts (MW) and ending at 950 MW. Between each of these 
rounds, policy was changed and refined. For instance, in order to 
prevent developers from bidding at unacceptably low prices to secure 
the right to develop a wind farm, the criterion changed in 2005 from 
“lowest-price bid wins” to various factors outside of price being 
weighted. Initially, the price was weighted at 40 per cent; it was fur-
ther reduced to 25 per cent in 2006 (Li et al. 2007). Other criteria 
became more important for winning a bid: domestic manufacturing 
content, overall capability, technical planning, grid price and econom-
ic benefit, each having been given a weighted score (Li et al. 2006). 
The concession rounds provided important lessons in shaping the 
pricing mechanisms of the Renewable Energy Law, where “govern-
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ment-guided” prices were decided on the basis of the concession 
project pricing (Martinot 2010). These prices were, in turn, at the 
base of the nationwide feed-in tariff prices (implemented in August 
2009), and determined prices for four different geographical zones 
sorted by wind resource quality (Martinot and Li 2010; Wang, Qin 
and Lewis 2012). As the interviewee from the Global Wind Energy 
Council pointed out:  
The concessions are only a small share of the whole wind devel-
opment. The government is using [the concessions] as small pro-
jects that demonstrate what the government wants the wind in-
dustry to be; they want it to be modernised, to be bigger, to rise 
and lead […] the global trend (Anonymous 1 2011). 
What started as an experimental policy in 2003 was scaled up and laid 
the basis for both policy learning and further refinements in wind 
power development up until 2009. The NDRC’s coordinating role in 
the concession projects was important, but the concession rounds in 
themselves were useful for experimenting and gaining experience 
with pricing policies, which facilitated the coordination of further 
wind power projects through the national feed-in tariff. This policy 
development process therefore conforms to Heilmann’s (2008a, 
2008b) policy experimentation thesis. 
Speedy Approvals 
Until 2011, China’s wind industry saw a rapid expansion; yet, since 
2011, there has been a slowdown. This slowdown is highly relevant 
for the governance of the wind sector; as coordination premised its 
rapid development in 2003, it was also coordination that led the ex-
pansion to a halt in 2011, by centralising the approval of new wind 
farms.  
Between 2003 and 2011, more than 90 per cent of constructed 
wind farms in China were approved by local governments – some-
thing that led to a mismatch between local wind farms and centrally 
planned power grid construction (Li et al. 2012). These local govern-
ments handled each tender application efficiently, and new projects 
were rolled out quickly. Included in the aforementioned concession 
rounds were projects of more than 50 MW, which needed approval 
from the central government (NDRC). Projects below 50 MW could 
typically be approved by local governments, and this led to large 
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numbers of projects sized at 49.5 MW, many of which were installed 
right next to each other, making their real sizes much larger (Jiang 
2011). As of 2011, China centralised this decision, and all wind pro-
jects were then required to be approved by the National Energy Ad-
ministration. This new legislation approved a total of approximately 
27 GW for the 12th Five-Year period (up to 2015), 13 GW for state-
approved projects and 14 GW for those locally approved (Li et al. 
2012). In April 2012, a second group of approved projects totalled 15 
GW. Any projects that were not approved through this bill were not 
accepted (Li et al. 2012). In addition to 18 new technical standards 
issued in 2011 – limiting access to turbine manufacturers that did not 
apply to these standards – the change in the approval process consid-
erably altered the growth of new wind farms in China. Thus, decen-
tralisation of authority was beneficial for the speedy growth of Chi-
na’s wind industry, and, by centralising this authority, growth slowed. 
In other words, fragmentation and centralisation are characteristics 
the government can draw on to reach development targets.  
The reason local governments decided to approve projects so 
quickly can be attributed to their quest for economic growth. What 
we observe here is a divergence between provincial and central gov-
ernment interests that characterise Chinese politics. Local govern-
ments are increasingly concerned with stimulating local economic 
growth, and wind power projects were attractive to local economies 
looking for a boost (Anonymous 7 2011). Although provinces have 
become more economically independent from the centre (Saich 2011: 
183), central government approval also shapes provinces’ opinions on 
profitable investments. As a result, when a company or sector re-
ceives central support, they are considered a safer bet for provincial 
governments seeking to build up an industry. This makes a difference 
when local governments face the choice of whether to start a wind 
project or a thermal power project. 
Legitimacy and Centralisation 
In order for a new industry to come into existence, a certain level of 
legitimacy is required. In China, important policy measures have been 
directed at established energy companies that have pre-existing legit-
imacy. An example of this is the government’s introduction of the 
mandated market share of non-hydro renewable energy for the estab-
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lished power producers in China. This mandate was a clear signal that 
the road to renewables was to go through the existing power utilities, 
irrespective of their ties to coal and hydropower. Another strong 
signal of commitment comes when areas of priority are decided 
through long-term plans by central and local governments. The Five-
Year Plan is the most important government document, and the at-
tention given to new and renewable energy has increased over the 
course of twelve Five-Year Plans, beginning with the sixth and cul-
minating with the latest plan, covering the period of 2011 to 2015 
(Yuan and Zuo 2011). Without a doubt, these government indica-
tions play an important role in paving the way for emerging indus-
tries. This section highlights three more avenues that draw on central 
government authority and legitimacy in the development of the wind 
industry. 
Control of Media 
In the Chinese wind turbine industry, the role of the media was 
acutely observed in the context of the 2011 downturn. Several in-
formants mentioned that in 2011, stories about quality issues and 
poorly functioning turbines started appearing in the media. As the 
Chinese media is largely state-controlled, the CCP can dictate what is 
allowed to be reported. This was highlighted by the informant from 
the Global Wind Energy Council:  
[The government] can one day say that “we think this industry is 
very promising” and everything [is] good about it; […] everything 
you can see related to wind in the news is good. This reinforces 
the industry to expand. Now, this year, it’s a time when some of 
the problems that were hidden started to get exposed […]. Every 
problem was there two years ago; it’s just that people were not al-
lowed to say it, so it didn’t seem to be there. But now we are sud-
denly allowed to say that [there are problems], and people get a 
feeling that wind started to show its side effects. But that’s not 
true; the side effects have always been there, it’s just that they are 
exposed at this stage (Anonymous 1 2011).  
This quote illuminates the importance of the media in establishing the 
legitimacy of the wind industry. What we are basically observing is a 
government that uses legitimacy as a tool to increase or decrease 
interest in the wind industry, fluctuating with current development 
goals. To be sure, highlighting the challenges that the industry faces 
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regarding turbine quality or grid connection issues is important for 
the overall performance of the industry. Yet, that these issues were 
evident for some years prior to 2011 and there had not been any 
repercussions testifies to the importance of information control in 
China. This form of legitimation is, therefore, a well-trained muscle 
of China’s institutional body, and its strength ultimately depends on 
the degree to which the government (the CCP) and industry goals are 
in sync. This well-trained muscle led to rapid growth in the period 
until 2011, and when a focus on quality finally emerged it contributed 
to slowing growth. 
Politics over Economics 
The Chinese wind industry has gained legitimacy within established 
institutions by using the pre-existing influence of energy incumbents 
to shape outcomes. Many of the large, influential state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) have engaged in wind turbine manufacturing, and their 
regional political influence has facilitated their growth. According to 
the informant from the wind turbine manufacturer XEMC Wind-
power, subsidiary of the large multi-industry conglomerate Xiangtan 
Electric Manufacturing Corporation (XEMC), the company “has a 
certain influence in Hunan Province, because the governor of Hunan 
Province came from XEMC”. As a result of the company’s political 
connections, it has been able to convince policymakers of the bene-
fits of wind turbines. Indeed, there is a well-documented link between 
SOEs, economic performance and political careers (Andrews-Speed 
2011; Li et al. 2008; Xu 2011). This relates to the Ministry of Person-
nel, which has the capacity to appoint or dismiss the senior executive 
leadership of even large SOEs. Often, industry professionals are ap-
pointed to these positions because of their technical insights, and 
these positions are, in turn, used as stepping stones for political car-
eers, similar to that of the XEMC executive (Rosen and Houser 
2007). This means that the leadership of large energy companies must 
be attentive to party politics, and balance central political demands 
against personal ambitions and provincial needs. All large, state-
owned energy companies are mandated (through the Renewable En-
ergy Law) to produce electricity from renewable energy sources, and 
failure to comply can hamper company advancement and political 
careers. One interviewee put it this way:  
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The incentive for the leaders of the power companies to fulfil this 
requirement is that they will be held accountable if targets are not 
reached […] and this will directly impact their personal careers 
(Anonymous 2 2011). 
Moreover, central government support often means more in terms of 
politics than in terms of economics. This was demonstrated in several 
interviews – for instance, with XEMC Windpower: 
The company’s own investment is larger than government fund-
ing, but state funding is also very important to us; it shows that 
the state encourages [us] to keep up. Especially for our group, a 
very large SOE with a long history, the state funds mean more [in 
terms of] encouragement than […] real impact. After the state 
funding, we have more voice in Hunan Province, which means the 
Hunan provincial government would be more supportive to us 
(Anonymous 5 2011). 
A similar line of argumentation was presented by a government offi-
cial from the Energy Research Institute of the NDRC: 
[The government] has promoted R&D a bit; some national re-
search centres and test centres have been supported by the gov-
ernment. And that has been enough because it proved the legiti-
macy of the industry (Anonymous 8 2011). 
Central government subsidies and support eliminate some of the risk 
local governments face in choosing their investment strategies, and 
allow large companies to be more confident in entering a new indus-
try such as the wind industry. The central government, therefore, 
incentivises SOEs to follow its legislation by appealing to a com-
pany’s success and the benefits to the political careers of managers, 
and by showing its support it also makes a company more likely to 
succeed. 
Related Industries 
The political power and legitimacy accumulated in other industries 
has also been marshalled for the wind industry. Most of the large 
turbine manufacturers in China have parent companies from related 
industries within machinery and equipment manufacturing, as well as 
direct links with electric power utilities. A case of the latter is Guo-
dian United Power, a subsidiary of Guodian, which is one of the five 
state-owned electric power companies (the “big five”) and by far 
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China’s largest wind power installer (Li et al. 2012). Since Guodian 
United Power was established in 2007, it has grown to become the 
third-largest Chinese turbine manufacturer (a milestone reached in 
2013) and it is one of the fastest-growing companies in the wind in-
dustry (WWEA 2014; Li et al. 2012). The company has benefitted 
greatly from the unique position of its parent company in wind farm 
development, which was also emphasised in an interview with the 
Deputy Director of United Power’s Chief Engineering Office, Mr. 
Xiao Jinsong: 
United Power has the advantage of control throughout the entire 
supply chain. In addition to providing the complete machine, we 
also produce major components – blades, gearboxes, generators, 
pitch systems, inverters, etc. Furthermore, our parent company, 
Guodian, is the largest wind power developer in Asia (DNV 2011, em-
phasis added). 
The experience of large industrial companies has been crucial for the 
advancement of many wind turbine manufacturers, many of which 
have come from the coal power equipment manufacturing industry. 
The three largest coal power equipment manufacturers, Shanghai 
Electric Group, Harbin Electric Corporation and Dongfang Electric 
Corporation, which provide nearly all the advanced coal power 
equipment in China (Yue 2012), all have subsidiaries in wind turbine 
manufacturing. For instance, the central government–administered 
Dongfang Electric, the fourth-largest Chinese wind turbine manufac-
turer in 2013 (WWEA 2014), has a history of more than 50 years in 
manufacturing heavy-duty machinery and equipment, such as steam 
and hydro-turbine generators (DEC 2012). This company, one of the 
largest steam turbine producers in China, did not engage with the 
wind industry until 2005, when it started cooperating with European 
turbine design companies (Zhao, Hu, and Zuo 2009). In addition, 
Shanghai Electric has signed strategic alliances with the Western firm 
Siemens. All these companies have become large actors within the 
Chinese wind industry by exploiting their established legitimacy with-
in China’s institutional framework. They have, indeed, taken ad-
vantage of their carbon-intense backgrounds to diversify into low-
carbon industries. 
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Discussion 
The previous section has shown how the media, local politics and 
related industries have been drawn on to facilitate development of 
wind power in China. However, this choice of governance carries 
with it several “nuisances” that lead to goals being reached only par-
tially or with several consequences. One recurrent topic is the priority 
of quantity over quality, and policies are often created without any 
enforcement mechanisms in place. Two major challenges associated 
with the renewable energy law are 1) the absence of functioning en-
forcement mechanisms and 2) a lack of clear formulation of respon-
sibilities. These two problems together reduce the commitment of 
grid companies to acquire wind-generated electricity. For instance, 
the law requires grid companies to acquire all electricity they produce 
from renewable energy, but the wording “guaranteed acquisition” is 
not adequately defined. This leaves room for interpretation, and grid 
companies end up curtailing wind power without any repercussions 
(Li et al. 2012). Furthermore, wind power producers are also required 
to assist grid companies in ensuring power supply safety, which gives 
grid companies more arguments to curtail wind power when there is 
an oversupply.  
One of the drawbacks of the central government’s strategic  
usage of SOEs and established companies is related to the preference 
of industry creation, and hence quantity before quality. This affects 
the wind industry through the Chinese banking system, which is gov-
ernment-controlled: In 2009 four major commercial banks accounted 
for more than 70 per cent of China’s financial assets (Walter and 
Howie 2011). The main task for Chinese banks has largely been to 
support the SOEs, even after economic reforms of the banking and 
finance sectors (Walter and Howie 2011). According to Saich (2011), 
commercial banks are directed to lend to state-owned enterprises, 
even though three so-called “policy banks”, which specifically look 
after government-mandated lending, were created in 1994. In effect, 
this means that the banks are instruments that the government can 
use to achieve development goals. One key measure the government 
uses to control the market is the deposit reserve ratio (Anonymous 6 
2011): the minimum reserve amount each bank must hold of custom-
er deposits. This ratio had been increased several times before 2011, 
making it more difficult for the banks to lend out money, contrib-
uting to the 2011 slowdown of the wind industry.  
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In order to fully grasp what this means for the wind industry, re-
call that the largest investors in wind power projects are large energy 
investment companies owned by the central government. These 
SOEs obtain loans more easily than private competitors, and this 
preference for SOEs may, in turn, cause scale advantages, as pointed 
out by the interviewee from GWEC:  
In general […] [the SOEs] will order in large quantities and of 
course this will give them an advantage in negotiating the compo-
nent’s price, and that of course will get the price down (Anonym-
ous 1 2011). 
Even though the support of large SOEs has created rapid growth 
thus far, their preference could lead to a lack of project evaluation 
behind credit decisions. This concern was expressed by an experi-
enced wind energy consultant in China, who commented:  
The government approves the projects and the money is going to 
state-owned companies, so within the state sector there is no ma-
jor perception of risk. On the one hand, there is no technical and 
commercial diligence, or specifically what we would call “project 
finance” behind most wind farms. But on the other hand, when 
the signal is alright, every loan officer or every bank knows it’s not 
a bad idea to lend money to wind projects, and that has enabled 
the wind industry to flourish (Anonymous 7 2011). 
We thus see that the preference for low-quality, state-owned projects, 
induced by government investment, is potentially destructive. The 
strategy of supporting SOEs will likely continue, although the slow-
down since 2011 has impacted these companies.  
As Table 1 shows, there are both drawbacks to and benefits to 
be gained from fragmentation and centralisation. The successful or-
chestration of both of these characteristics of China’s policy govern-
ance is what determines the final outcome. 
Table 1: Impacts of Fragmentation and Centralisation 
 Benefit Disadvantage 
Fragmentation Rapid growth Low grid connection 
Centralisation Legitimacy Quality 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
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García argues that gradualism, consisting of experimental and incre-
mental policymaking, creates barriers in China such as “legal insecuri-
ty, fragmentation of bureaucracy[,] targets that remain non-binding” 
(García 2011: 8048), and so on. This paper has shown that gradualism 
and fragmentation are not entirely negative: Experimentation has 
paved the way for new policies, contributing to a quality check of 
policies with a smaller impact area, which have then been scaled up. 
The concession rounds amounted to 43 per cent of the total installed 
wind power capacity by the end of the last centrally given concession, 
meaning that they were not the largest source of turbine installations 
at that point. However, the concession rounds predated the Renew-
able Energy Law and provided useful experience for fine-tuning the 
legislative measures.  
The policy choice has not been innovative. In fact, successful 
wind policies have tended to be very similar, globally (Lewis and 
Wiser 2007). But the way policy has been implemented – by combin-
ing experiments, which are then scaled up, with a fluctuation of cen-
tral government involvement in the industry – has proved effective. 
Fragmented authority in China’s policymaking system has been con-
ducive to implementing renewable power sources, as shown in the 
example of speedy approvals of wind farms. Local governments con-
ducted these approvals, and when misalignments occurred between 
central and provincial government development goals, centralisation 
of decision-making slowed development. At the same time, the ex-
perimental basis of policy development has gradually developed a 
larger framework for domestic and foreign wind industry actors in 
China. We can therefore say that this alternation between centralisa-
tion and fragmentation is similar to Cunningham’s (2009) “portfolio 
approach” thesis. 
Drawing together the insights on experimentation and the “port-
folio approach”, we see that the Chinese institutional framework is 
able to draw from established actors and networks, as well as to cre-
ate avenues for new ventures. These avenues often take the shape of 
experimentation with policies which are later scaled up. Fragmenta-
tion pervades China’s governing institutions, yet at the very apex, the 
CCP, by means of steering and guiding, shapes the direction and pace 
of new industry developments. These various processes behind 
change and inertia appear in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Processes behind Change and Inertia in China’s Wind Industry 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
Some impulses emanate from fragmentation and help induce change, 
and some originate from centralisation, drawing on hierarchy and 
accumulated status. The legitimacy held by state-owned enterprises, 
the invaluable experience accumulated in established firms, and the 
alluring prospects of political careers are all contingent on pre-exist-
ing authority. These processes are more inert and are capable of con-
straining as much as aiding change. 
Conclusions 
Surrounded by a dominating coal power industry, a wind power in-
dustry has grown in record time over the past ten years in China and 
the country has mustered an impressive ingenuity in fine-tuning pol-
icy mechanisms to induce the growth of a new industry. To be sure, 
the industry is facing considerable challenges; a quick industry build-
up comes with a price. This contribution has tried to understand 
what mechanisms apart from the laws and regulations have allowed 
for the rapid growth of China’s wind industry. The paper started out 
by describing the relevant policies for wind industry development, 
then it showed how policy experimentation and speedy approvals 
were useful for the rapid wind farm expansion. Later sections clari-
fied how the media, legitimacy and experience of existing and related 
industries sustained the decisions of the central government. I argue 
  196 Marius Korsnes 
 
that the Chinese government’s navigational skills in growing a domes-
tic wind industry are remarkable and that this feat must be under-
stood within a larger institutional framework. 
Fragmentation in China’s energy governance has allowed for a 
fast-growing wind turbine market. In times when industry develop-
ment was sorely needed in order to create domestic wind turbine 
manufacturers, local governments were allowed to approve wind 
farm projects, and the media and other actors focused solely on non-
critical issues with development. In times of overcapacity, the tune 
changed radically. This was especially evident after 2011, when the 
full force of centralising power was levied onto the industry and the 
wind industry growth rate declined. The government is indeed flexing 
all the muscles in its institutional body in order to navigate the devel-
opment.  
The institutional traits inducing the rapid growth of China’s wind 
power industry are based on legitimacy, alignment of expectations, 
and visions of incumbent and upcoming actors. China has managed 
to leverage space for wind energy, and the processes behind the 
change from fragmentation to alignment have been dominated by 
considerable policy flexibility. In practice, the government has in-
duced policy experiments, which have set in motion some of the large 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These, in turn, have had an influence 
both locally and nationally, and have lobbied towards increased policy 
support for wind energy. We can therefore conclude that the CCP 
takes strategic advantage of fragmentation and coordination to steer 
the pace of development in the wind industry.  
These conclusions have implications for other industries as well. 
The offshore wind industry in China is currently experiencing a simi-
lar stalemate to that faced by the onshore industry in 2006, and we 
can expect developments as soon as interests between the different, 
relevant authorities have been aligned. Furthermore, China’s quest for 
rapid growth has come at the expense of quality. For instance, the 
development goals set by the government have consistently been 
measured in terms of installed capacity, and not in terms of total 
electricity generated and delivered to the grid. A lack of incentive to 
ensure long-term electricity generation permeates the whole industry 
chain from component suppliers to local governments approving 
wind farms, SOEs investing in the wind farms and grid utilities man-
aging the wind farms. This lack of quality control is inherent in Chi-
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nese institutions, and it will likely remain a concern for Chinese com-
panies seeking to export their products (Gosens and Lu 2013, 2014). 
Future research should be directed at determining exactly how these 
institutional traits influence current industry development in China, 
and if there is a necessary trade-off between rapid catch-up and suffi-
cient quality control.  
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Appendix: List of Interviewees 
Company / 
Organisation 
Date 
Background of 
interviewee 
Affiliation 
Global Wind Energy 
Council (GWEC) Sep. 2011 China Director  
Policy/ 
Research 
Hanergy Holding Group 
Limited (wind power 
developer) 
Sep. 2011 Representative Industry 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
GmbH 
Sep. 2011 
Project Manager, 
Renewable Energy 
Programme 
Policy/ 
Research 
Chinese Renewable Energy 
Industry Association 
(CREIA) 
Sep. 2011 Vice–Secretary-General 
Policy/ 
Research 
Energy Research Institute 
(ERI) of the National 
Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC)  
Sep. 2011 Deputy Director-General 
Government/ 
Policy 
XEMC Windpower Oct. 2011 Key Account Manager Industry 
China Creative Wind 
Energy Co. Ltd. Oct. 2011 Sales Manager Industry 
Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance (BNEF) Nov. 2011 Wind Analyst 
Policy/ 
Research 
Nordex China Nov. 2011 Marketing Manager Industry 
Azure International Nov. 2011 
China Wind 
Expert, Director 
Research and 
Advisory 
Policy/ 
Research 
Energy Research Institute 
(ERI) of the National 
Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) 
Nov. 2011 
Research Associate 
on Economy and 
Energy Policy 
Government/ 
Policy 
Goldwind Science and 
Technology Co. Nov. 2011 
Technical Support 
Engineer Industry 
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